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Abstract 
We adopt a ‘system-of-systems’ framework of analysis, previously presented by the authors, 
to include the interdependent infrastructures which support a critical plant in the study of its 
safety with respect to the occurrence of an earthquake. We extend the framework to consider 
the recovery of the system of systems in which the plant is embedded. As a test system, we 
consider the impacts produced on a nuclear power plant (the critical plant) embedded in the 
connected power and water distribution, and transportation networks which support its 
operation. The Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment of such system of systems is carried out 
by Hierarchical modeling and Monte Carlo simulation. First, we perform a top-down analysis 
through a hierarchical model to identify the elements that at each level have most influence in 
restoring safety, adopting the criticality importance measure as a quantitative indicator. Then, 
we evaluate by Monte Carlo simulation the probability that the nuclear power plant enters in 
an unsafe state and the time needed to recover its safety. The results obtained allow the 
identification of those elements most critical for the safety and recovery of the nuclear power 
plant; this is relevant for determining improvements of their structural/functional responses 
and supporting the decision-making process on safety critical-issues. On the test system 
considered, under the given assumptions, the components of the external and internal water 
systems (i.e., pumps and pool) turn out to be the most critical for the safety and recovery of 
the plant. 
 
Keywords: System of systems, Recovery, Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment, 
Hierarchical representation, Monte Carlo simulation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We consider a safety-critical plant, e.g., a nuclear power plant (NPP), exposed to an external 
hazard, e.g., an earthquake. Internal emergency devices have been designed to provide safety 
for the plant upon occurrence of the hazardous event, i.e., even if the infrastructure services 
are not available. However, the history of industrial accidents, including the recent Fukushima 
nuclear disaster [1], has shown us that the safety of a plant depends also on the infrastructures 
in which it is embedded, which may or may not provide “resilience” properties. Then, the 
analysis for the evaluation of the probability that a critical plant remains or not in a safe state, 
i.e., in a condition that does not cause health and/or environmental damages, upon occurrence 
of an external accident event, must extend to the interdependent infrastructures connected to 
it, adopting a “system-of-systems” point of view [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. For this, we 
adopt the framework of analysis proposed by the authors in [9] and extend it to include the 
capacity of the system of recovering from an external aggression or shock, using as 
representative quantity the recovery time, i.e., the period necessary to restore a desired level 
of functionality of a system after the shock [10].  
As a test system for the developments of our considerations and analyses, we consider the 
impacts of an earthquake on a nuclear power plant, extending the system boundaries to the 
power and water distribution, and the transportation networks (the interdependent 
infrastructure systems) that can provide services necessary for keeping or restoring its safety. 
The test system is fictitious and highly simplified, intended only to illustrate the way of 
analyzing the problem under a “system-of-systems” viewpoint, accounting for the effects of 
the interdependencies. 
The systemic analysis is performed in two main steps. In the first step, a conceptual map 
previously built by the authors [9] to understand all the dependencies and interdependencies 
between the components of the infrastructure systems connected to the nuclear power plant is 
exploited to construct a hierarchical representation of the system of systems. Hierarchical 
modeling is here used for a top-down analysis of the elements that at each level have most 
influence in restoring safety. Indeed, the hierarchical representation facilitates the 
identification of the structure of the system of systems, allowing the determination of the 
critical elements [11]. As a quantitative indicator of the contribution of the components to the 
recovery of safety, the criticality importance measure is used [12], [13]. 
In the second step, Monte Carlo simulation [14], [15], [16] is applied to compute 1) the 
probability that the nuclear power plant enters in an unsafe state and 2) the time of recovery of 
the safety of the nuclear power plant, accounting for the contributions of both the internal 
emergency devices and the connected infrastructures. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic concepts of a 
Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment are introduced; in Section 3, the hierarchical modeling 
of a system of systems and Monte Carlo simulation framework for Seismic Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment are described; in Section 4, the test system and the results of the analysis are 
presented; in Section 5, conclusions are provided. 
2. METHOD FOR SEISMIC PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
To estimate the probabilities of occurrence of different levels of earthquake ground motion 
that may affect an infrastructure and its response to such event, a Seismic Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (SPRA) is typically applied. In a very short and schematic synthesis, it is based 
on three parts [17], [18]:  
• Seismic Hazard Analysis: computes the probabilities of occurrence of different levels 
of earthquake ground motion at a site of interest. 
• Seismic Fragility Evaluation: identifies the seismic capacity of a component in terms 
of its conditional probability of failure for any given ground motion level. 
• System Analysis: integrates the outputs of the hazard and fragility analyses to evaluate 
the impact of an external event to the infrastructure of interest. 
 
The first part is traditionally developed as a Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) 
consisting of four procedural steps [17], [18], [19]: 
1) Earthquake source zones identification and characterization 
2) Earthquake recurrence relationship definition 
3) Ground motion attenuation relationship formulation 
4) Exceedance probability calculation 
The first step concerns the identification and characterization of the seismic sources in the 
proximity of the site of interest. It involves geological, seismological, geophysical data and 
scientific interpretations; as a consequence it is a critical part of the analysis and it is 
associated with considerable uncertainty [17], [18]. The major outputs of this step are the 
seismic map that defines the seismic zones (areas where the earthquake sources have common 
characteristics like geometry, earthquake activity, earthquake annual recurrence rate), the 
probability distribution of the source-to-site distance and the identification of the maximum 
earthquake magnitude, i.e., the largest magnitude that a source can generate [17], [18].  
In the second step, the seismic earthquake recurrence relationship, i.e., the annual frequency 
of occurrence of a given magnitude event for each source, is defined. Typically, it is described 
by the Gutenberg-Richter law, log	() = 	 −  where n is the number of earthquakes with 
magnitude1 greater than m and a and b are parameters obtained by regression data analysis 
[17], [18]. This relation implies that the magnitude is exponentially distributed [22], [23]:   
() = 1 − β            (1) 
where β =  ≅ 2,303 represents the relative frequency of smaller to larger events. 
Equation 1, however, is an unbounded probability distribution so that the magnitude can 
assume very high values, which are unrealistic and very low values, which are negligible. 
Therefore, the distribution is double-truncated by upper and lower bounds, mmax and mmin, 
respectively, and it is reformulated as follows [17]: 
() = (   !")(  #$  !")          (2) 
The third step identifies the ground motion value at the site of interest, given the source-to-
site distance and the magnitude. The higher the distance from the source, the lower is the 
ground motion value. Typical ground motion parameters are the peak ground acceleration and 
the spectral acceleration. Many ground motion equations have been defined on the basis of the 
earthquake and site characteristics [24]. They usually assume this expression [17]:  
%& = ' + ') + '*'+ + ',log	-. + '/ exp('3)4 + '5. + (67.8) + (69:) (3) 
where z’ is the mean ground motion parameter, Ci, i=1,…,8, are the regression coefficients, r 
is the source-to-site distance, m is the magnitude and g(source) and g(site) are terms that 
reflect the characteristics of the source and site, respectively. 
For example, the peak ground acceleration is well described by [25]: 
%& = ' + ')+ ('* + '+) ∗ <.) + ',) + '/=> + '3=? + '5@ + 'AB + 'C   (4) 
where SS and SA represent the types of soil (soft, stiff or rock, when both variables are set to 
zero) and FN, FT and FO describe the faulting mechanism (normal, thrust or odd). 
                                                 
1
 The magnitude scale typically used is the moment magnitude defined by [20]. For medium size earthquakes it 
is similar to the Richter values [21]. 
In the fourth step, the probability of exceedance of ground motion in any time interval is 
computed by an analytical integration for each magnitude, distance and ground motion value 
by the following equation [17]: 
ν(%) = ∑ EFGFH (FI) J J KL!(.|)K!()N(O > %|, .)Q #$Q !" #$ !" RR.   (5) 
where 9 = 1,… , = represents the source zone, KL!(.|) and K!() are the probability density 
functions of the source to site distance and of the magnitude, respectively, N(O > %|, .) is 
the probability of exceedance of the ground motion for each source zone, FI, TU, .FI, 
	.TU are the lower and upper bounds of the magnitude and distance considered and EF(FI) 
is a rate that removes the contribution of earthquakes with magnitude lower than FI that is 
not significant. 
 
In the second part of the SPRA, a fragility evaluation is carried out to provide the parameter 
values (i.e., the median acceleration capacity Am and the logarithmic standard deviation due to 
randomness and to uncertainty in the median capacity βr and βu, respectively) of the 
component fragility model of the kind [17]: 
K& = Φ VWXYZ
[\
] ^_`aΦb(c)`d e          (6) 
where f’ is the conditional probability of failure for any given ground motion level z’ and Q is 
the subjective probability of not exceeding a fragility f’. 
 
In the third part, an evaluation of the consequences of the seismic event to the infrastructure 
under analysis is traditionally performed by the development of event trees and logic models 
for each event tree top event [17]. In this work we adopt a hierarchical representation and a 
Monte Carlo simulation for this evaluation. 
3. METHOD FOR SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND RECOVERY 
ANALYSIS 
In this Section, the hierarchical representation of a system of systems (Section 3.1) and the 
operative steps of the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation method for its Seismic Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (SPRA) (Section 3.2) are summarized. 
3.1. Hierarchical representation of a system of systems 
Let us denote a system i at the level L of the hierarchy as =F(f) and by gG(f) the number of 
systems at the level L. In the hierarchical representation of a system-of-systems view of a 
critical plant, h, at the top of the hierarchy there is only gG() = 1 system, the critical plant 
itself, and it is denoted as =(). At the second level, i = 2, this is connected to gG()) systems, 
=F()), 9 = 1, … ,gG()), inside and outside the plant, that provide it with the necessary inputs for 
its operation. The systems =F()), 9 = 1,… ,gG()), at level i = 2, can, in turn, be broken down 
into subsystems =F(*), 9 = 1,… ,gG(*) at the third level of the hierarchy, i = 3. The hierarchical 
modeling is built by identifying the elements (or groups) that are “part of” the parent objects, 
and continuing up to the desired level i = gf, where gf is the number of levels of the 
hierarchy. For the analysis of interest here, the hierarchy is continued down to the level of 
details of the individual components of the system of systems. However, following this 
procedure for building the hierarchical model, some components may not be considered. 
Actually, some elements of the system of systems i) may not provide the critical plant H with 
the inputs necessary for its operation, thus, they cannot be represented in the level-2 of the 
hierarchy, and ii) may not be part of any system =F()), 9 = 1,… ,gG()), thus, they cannot be 
identified by the decomposition criteria. These components (hereafter called “recovery 
supporting elements”) provide the components (or groups) of the systems =F()), 9 = 1,… ,gG()), 
with the inputs necessary for their functioning or recovery and are here represented as a part 
of the systems (groups) they support.  
 
By way of example, refer to Figure 1 in which the graph of the system (top), the grouping of 
its components (middle) and its hierarchical representation (bottom) are depicted. The intra-
system dependencies (solid lines), the inter-system ones (dashed lines) and the connections to 
the critical plant h (bold lines) are identified (Figure 1, top). The increasing resolution in the 
four levels considered is illustrated (Figure 1, middle): in the first level (square shape), the 
critical plant h is represented; in the second level (dashed oval shape), the three 
interdependent systems, =F()), 9 = 1, … , 3 are reported; in the third and fourth levels (dotted 
and solid oval shapes, respectively), the grouping of the elements within the systems of level 
2 are specified. In Figure 1, top, the recovery supporting elements are those not connected to 
the critical plant H but linked to other components by dashed lines (i.e., =(+) and =)(+)); in 
Figure 1, middle, they are grouped in the systems to which they provide support, e.g., =(+) is 
both in the systems =()) and =)()) and =)(+) is in the system =*()); in Figure 1, bottom, they are 
represented in the last levels of the hierarchy according to the grouping of the Figure 1 in the 
middle. Notice that the recovery supporting elements can belong to more systems (or groups) 
since they can be a support to different components (or groups), whereas all the others 
components (or groups) are within just one system since they are built following the criteria 
“to be a part of”. A final remark is in order with respect to the top-down approach adopted to 
build the hierarchical model. It is possible that, before reaching the bottom of the hierarchy, 
some components cannot be subdivided further (e.g., =)(*) coincides with =(+)) leading to an 
incomplete hierarchical representation. Therefore, in this circumstance, a copy of those 
elements is reported in the levels they are absent [26]. 
  
 
Figure 1: Top: dependencies among the components of the system of systems; the links represent the intra-
systems dependencies (solid lines), the inter-systems dependencies (dashed lines) and the dependencies of the 
critical plant H on its interconnected systems (bold lines). Middle: graphical representation of their grouping; 
the rectangular, dashed, dotted and solid oval shapes represent the increasing resolution in the hierarchical 
level. Bottom: corresponding hierarchical representation; L: Level. 
 
A system =F(f), 9 = 1,… ,gG(f), at level i − 1, i = 2,… ,gf, can be in an operational or in 
a failure state depending on the states of the systems at the level i, on their functionality and 
on their logic connections. A state (truth) matrix is associated to each system =F(f), 9 =
1, … , gG(f), i = 2,… ,gf, where the first columns represent the states of the systems =F(f), 
9 = 1, … ,gG(f), at level i and the last column represent the state of the system =F(f), 
9 = 1, … ,gG(f), at level i − 1. The entries {aij} are equal to 1 or 0 according to whether the 
states are in a failure state or not.  
By way of example, refer to Table 1 and Figure 2 where three state matrices and the 
corresponding fault trees are reported, with reference to the system =,(*) at level i = 3 of 
Figure 1 (middle) composed by the systems =(+) and =)(+) at level i = 4. The first two state 
matrices represent, respectively, the series and parallel configurations between the systems 
=(+) and =)(+) (illustrated by the OR and the AND gate in the fault trees): in the first case, the 
state of =,(*) can assume only one operational state, since the failure of =(+) or =)(+) causes its 
failure; whereas, in the second case, =,(*) is in a failure state when both =(+) and =)(+) fail. The 
third matrix shows a case in which the state of =,(*) depends only on the state of =(+). The 
fault tree of this last case is represented by an inhibit gate without condition on the system 
=)(+).  
Table 1: Three possible state matrices for the system =,(*) of Figure 1 (middle) on the basis of the states of the 
systems =(+) and =)(+). On the left: =(+) and =)(+) are connected in series; in the middle: =(+) and =)(+) are 
connected in parallel; on the right: =,(*) depends only on =(+); 1 represents the failure state. 
 
 
 
 
 
klm(n) ko(n) kp(q) 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 1 
1 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
klm(n)	 ko(n)	 kp(q)	
0 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
1 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
klm(n)	 ko(n)	 kp(q)	
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 0 
1 1 1 
 
 
Figure 2: Corresponding fault tree representation of the state matrices reported in Table 1. On the left, =(+) and =)(+) are connected in series (OR gate); in the middle, =(+) and =)(+) are connected in parallel (AND gate); on the 
right, =,(*) depends only on =(+) (INHIBIT gate without condition). 
To define the appropriate state matrix for the systems =F(f), 9 = 1,… ,gG(f), i = 2,… ,gf, 
a deep understanding of their functionality is necessary. The dependencies identified in Figure 
1 (top) are a support for this analysis. 
3.2. Monte Carlo simulation for Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment within a system-
of-systems framework 
Within the system-of-systems analysis framework here purported, we wish to evaluate the 
safety of the critical plant h exposed to the risk from earthquakes occurrence, accounting not 
only for the direct effects of the earthquake on h but also for the structural and functional 
responses of the connected systems =F()), 9 = 1,… ,gG()), inside and outside the plant, through 
the analysis of the underlying dependency structure. In addition, we wish to determine the 
capacity of recovering of the system of systems, evaluating the period necessary to restore the 
safety of the critical plant. To do this, we adopt the hierarchical representation of the system 
of systems and Monte Carlo (MC) simulation for the quantitative SPRA evaluation [27]. The 
simulation procedure consists of the following operative steps: 
1. choose a value of magnitude with respect to which the analysis is performed; 
2. compute the ground acceleration value at each of the =F(f), 9 = 1,… ,gG(f), i = 	gf, 
elements of the system of systems, by equation 4; gG(@r) is the number of elements at 
the last level of the hierarchy, i.e., in our case, the number of individual components; 
3. compute the fragility, K, for all the components =F(@r), 9 = 1,… ,gG(@r)	, of the system 
of systems by equation 6; K is a vector of gG(@r) values, one for each individual 
component in the system; 
4. sample a matrix of uniform random numbers in [0,1) s7t,uv, w = 1,… ,gB, x =
1, … , gG(@r), where gB is the number of simulations; 
5. determine the fault state matrix st,uv, w = 1,… ,gB, x = 1, … , gG(@r)	, by comparing 
the fragility, K, with the matrix s7t,uv, w = 1,… ,gB, x = 1,… ,gG(@r): if 7t,u < Ku, set 
t,u = 1; otherwise set t,u = 0 for w = 1,… ,gB and	x = 1, … , gG(@r). When t,u 
assumes value 1, it means that in the j-th simulation the k-th component is hit by the 
earthquake, i.e., it enters a faulty state; otherwise, it survives. Each row of the matrix 
 represents the states of the gG(@r) system components in the j-th simulation; 
6. determine the state of the critical plant h. This is done by propagating bottom-up 
through the hierarchy the faulty states of the components: the states of the =F(@r) 
components and the state matrix at the level 	gf − 1 of the hierarchy are used to 
determine the states of the =F(@r) systems at the upper hierarchical level, i = gf − 1, 
and the evaluation is repeated for the states of the systems of the level gf − 2 and so 
on until the top level of the hierarchy, 	i = 1. 
In doing so, the state of h is evaluated for each row of the matrix st,uv, i.e., for each 
configuration of the system sampled. A vector sℎtv is then recorded, whose element 
ℎt , 	w = 1,… ,gB, assumes value 1 when the critical plant h is in an unsafe state and 0 
otherwise; 
7. estimate the probability of the critical plant h of being unsafe by computing the 
sample average of the values of the elements of the gB −dimensional vector sℎtv, 
w = 1,… ,gB. 
8. for each configuration of the system sampled that turns the critical plant h in an 
unsafe state, evaluate the recovery time (RT) by the following steps: 
a. sample a matrix s{_}Q,uv, . = 1, … , gL_B, x = 1,… ,gG(@r), where 	gL_B is the 
number of recovery time simulations of the =F(@r), 9 = 1,… ,gG(@r)	, elements of 
the system of systems that are in a faulty state; for each element the sampling 
is done from the respective recovery time distribution; 
b. determine the recovery time of the critical plant h, computing the recovery 
times at each hierarchical level accounting for the configurations of the 
systems =F(f), 9 = 1, … , gG(f), i = 	gf , … ,1, from bottom to top of the 
hierarchy. For example, if the systems at level i, are connected in series to the 
system at level i − 1, the recovery time of the latter is the maximum recovery 
time of the systems or components at the lower level i (Figure 3, left); if they 
are connected in parallel, the recovery time is the minimum (Figure 3, middle). 
In the other cases, specific evaluation should be performed. For example, if the 
failure of a given system =F(f), 9 = 1,… ,gG(f), does not affect the state of 
another system =t(f), w = 1,… ,gG(f), w ≠ 9, but plays a role in the operations of 
its recovery from failure it should be considered in the analysis like an 
increasing time for operations of recovery of the system at level i − 1 (Figure 
3, right).  
 Figure 3: Computation of recovery time (RT) of the system =,(*) with reference to three different configurations 
of the systems =(+) and =)(+) represented in the fault tree. On the left: OR gate, the recovery time of =,(*) is the 
maximum recovery time of =(+) and =)(+). In the middle: AND gate, the recovery time of =,(*) is the minimum 
recovery time of =(+) and =)(+). On the right, INHIBIT gate: the recovery time of =,(*) is the recovery time of =(+) 
but if the condition =)(+) = 1 is verified, the recovery time is the sum between the recovery times of =(+) and =)(+). 
1 represents the failure state. 
Notice that it is assumed that infinite resources (e.g., repair teams and material) are available 
for the restoration process so that the recovery can be performed at the same time on all 
components in need. This assumption is made considering that in emergency situations all the 
possible means, resources and actions are deployed to keep or restore the critical plant safety. 
In any case, extension to the situation of limited resources does not pose significant 
difficulties in both the modelling and its quantification. Finally, the components are 
considered with binary states: fully operative or completely damaged and also the critical 
plant can assume only two states: fully operative or totally failed. This approximation is not 
realistic and leads to pessimistic results: multi-state modeling may be considered for a more 
realistic description, where different degrees of damage are contemplated.  
4. EXEMPLIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED METHOD ON A TEST 
SYSTEM 
We consider the mock-up problem of [9] concerning the safety of a nuclear power plant (the 
critical plant), provided with proper internal emergency devices, in response to an earthquake 
(the external hazardous event) in a system-of-systems framework, i.e., extending the 
boundaries of the analysis to the responses of the interconnected systems that could help 
keeping or restoring the plant safe state. The nuclear power plant is considered in a safe 
condition if it does not cause health and environmental damages, i.e., if it does not release 
radioactive material to the environment; to maintain this state it must be provided with 
electrical and water inputs to absorb the heat that it generates. We analyze the capacity of 
recovering of the system of systems, in terms of the period necessary to restore the safe state 
of the plant. 
When an earthquake occurs, the critical plant may not receive the input necessary to be kept 
in, or restored to, a safe state due to the direct impact on its emergency devices (safety 
systems) and to the damages to the interconnected infrastructures. Two quantities are used to 
characterize the loss of functionality of the various components of the system of systems 
embedding the critical plant, upon the occurrence of a damaging external event: 
- from the safety viewpoint, the probability that the critical plant remains in safe state; 
- from the recovery viewpoint, the time needed to restore the safe state of the critical 
plant. 
Both quantities are here computed for two values of earthquake magnitude, 5.5 and 6, on the 
Richter scale. 
In Section 4.1, the description of the system studied is given under a number of assumptions 
which simplify the problem to the level needed to convey the key aspects of the conceptual 
system-of-systems framework, while maintaining generality. In Section 4.2, the hierarchical 
representation of the system and some considerations about its capacity of recovering are 
given. In Section 4.3, we provide the results of the evaluation of the two quantities of interest 
above mentioned. 
4.1. Description of the system  
The system under analysis is composed by a critical plant, i.e., a nuclear power plant, a water 
system that provides coolant useful to absorb the heat generated in the nuclear power plant, a 
power system that provides electrical energy for the running of the nuclear power plant and 
the water system, and a road network relevant to the power and water systems for the 
transport of material and/or plant operators. 
The water and power systems are subdivided into two independent parts, external and internal 
to the plant; the latter one represents the emergency system of the plant which needs to 
obviate at the absence of input from the main external system.  
In Figure 4, the physical representation of the system is reported referring to a spatial plane (x, 
y) with origin in the river. Table 2 reports the fragility parameters Am, βr and βu, adopted in 
this analysis, for illustration purposes. The values for the pump and the pipe components have 
been taken from [28] and [29], respectively, whereas the others fragility parameters have been 
assumed arbitrarily by the authors to perform the study with different values. Given the large-
scale system under analysis, two types of soil are considered, rock and soft. Figure 5 
represents the spatial localization of the system shown in Figure 4 with reference to the 
reciprocal position of all the components (Figure 5, left) and to the position of the system with 
respect to the considered earthquake epicenter A(70, 70) (Figure 5, right). The distances on 
the axes are expressed in kilometers. 
 
Figure 4: Physical representation of the system of systems. GS: Generation Station, S: Substation, Po: Pole, Pi: 
Pipe, Pu: Pump, DG: Diesel Generator, R: Road access.  
 
Table 2: Fragility parameters used in the present work. 
 
A
m
 β
r
 β
u
 
Generation station 0.7 0.3 0.1 
Substation 0.9 0.4 0.3 
Power Pole 0.8 0.2 0.2 
Diesel Generator 0.7 0.4 0.2 
Pipe 1.88 0.43 0.48 
Pump 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Pool 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Road 0.3 0.3 0.2 
 
 Figure 5: Left: spatial localization of the nuclear power plant (star) with respect to the components of the 
electric power system (circle, from top to bottom: Generation Station, Substation, Pole 1, Pole 2), water system 
(square, from left to right: Pipe 1, Pump 1, Pipe 2) and road transportation (triangle, from top to bottom and 
from left to right: R7, R6, R5, R4, R3, R2, R1). Right: spatial localization of the system of systems with respect to 
the earthquake’s epicenter A(70, 70). The horizontal bold line in both Figures represents the division between 
soft soil (above the line) and rock (below the line). 
In Figure 6, the system-of-systems representation is given by a conceptual map showing the 
components of the systems and their relationships, intra- and inter-systems. The intra-system 
dependencies are represented by the solid lines, the inter-system ones by dashed lines and 
those with the critical system by the bold lines. In addition, in the Figure the dependence of 
the system of systems on the type of soil on which the infrastructures rest is illustrated. 
The external water distribution system (Figure 6, left) is formed by a pump and pipes that 
carry the water. The external power distribution system (Figure 6, center) is composed by the 
following elements: a generation station that produces the electrical energy, a substation that 
transforms the voltage from high to low, and poles that support power lines. 
The components of the emergency water and power distribution systems inside the plant are 
shown in Figure 6 on the right. The first system is composed by the same elements of the 
corresponding external system considering in addition an artificial reservoir (i.e., the source of 
water), whereas the power system includes only the emergency diesel generators.  
The elements considered for the transportation system are the roads (Figure 6, top). The state 
of this system is important for access of the materials and operators that are needed to restore 
the components required for the safe state of the critical plant. Given their role, they are 
considered as recovery supporting elements (see Section 3.1). 
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 Figure 6: System of systems: conceptual map; the links represent the intra-systems dependencies (solid lines), 
the inter-systems dependencies (dashed lines) and the dependencies of the nuclear power plant on its 
interconnected systems (bold lines).  
The inter-system dependencies are modeled as links connecting components of the power, 
water and road transportation systems (Figure 6, dashed lines); these links are conceptually 
similar to those linking components of the individual systems (intra-systems dependencies), 
and are considered bidirectional with respect to the “flow” of dependence between the 
connected systems. For example, the external water system depends on the external power 
system as the pump needs electrical energy to work. Notice that this relation is expressed by a 
link from the pole to the pump because the first one, supporting the power lines, is the closest 
element to the pump that carries the power (the same reason explains the connection of the 
pole to the nuclear reactor and to the pump inside the nuclear power plant). While the pump 
of the external water system can receive electrical energy only from the external power 
distribution network, it is assumed that the pump inside the nuclear power plant can obtain it 
from both the external and internal power systems. 
The road transport network allows access to the components of the power and water systems 
for transporting material (e.g., fuel) and/or operators for operation and/or recovery. 
The transport system is composed by seven interdependent road access points to the 
components of the power and water systems. They are distributed as follows: one road access 
is available for the components outside the nuclear power plant and two road accesses for 
those inside, i.e., the components outside the nuclear power plant can only be reached by one 
road access, whereas the ones inside by two road accesses (the same two accesses are 
provided for all the components inside) (Figure 4). In particular, the components of the 
external power system are considered to have a different road access because they are far 
from each other (the minimum distance is 300 m between the generation station and the 
substation, Figure 5 left), the components of the external water system have the same road 
access, R3, because they are located close to each other (the total distance from the river to 
the nuclear power plant is 200 m, Figure 5 left) and the components of the power and water 
systems inside the nuclear power plant have the same two road accesses, R1 and R2, since 
they are contained in the same building. 
Among these road access points, only the one connected to the generation station, R7 in 
Figure 4, has an impact on the state of the system of systems because it contributes to the 
running of the generation station, carrying materials and operators. On the contrary, the other 
road accesses have no direct impact on the state of the system of systems since they are used 
only to repair the elements that enter in a faulty state. Therefore, their contribution is not of 
interest for the evaluation of the safety of the critical plant, but they are relevant for the 
analysis of the capacity of recovering of the system of systems. 
 
In this work we have not considered i) the power lines that, being aerial elements, are not 
directly affected by an earthquake and ii) the river, i.e., the source of water of the external 
water system, that it is assumed to be always available. Other aspects could be introduced in 
the analysis as i) the influence of the design, construction and materials of the infrastructures 
considered, ii) the supply of fuel and materials for plant operation, and iii) the maintenance 
tasks. However, in view of the methodological character of this work, for the sake of 
simplicity, we have not included them in the modelling. 
4.2. Hierarchical representation of the system of systems and its capacity of recovering  
From the conceptual map shown in Figure 6, the connections between the physical elements 
of the system of systems are presented in Figure 7. The solid, dashed and bold lines represent 
the intra-system dependencies, the inter-systems dependencies and the links to the nuclear 
power plant (NPP), respectively. The clusters taken into account in the analysis are identified 
in Figure 8, and they are structured hierarchically in Figure 9.  
 Figure 7: Dependencies among the components of the system of systems; the links represent the intra-systems 
dependencies (solid lines), the inter-systems dependencies (dashed lines) and the dependencies of the nuclear 
power plant (NPP) on its interconnected systems (bold lines). GS: Generation Station, S: Substation, Po: Pole, 
Pi: Pipe, Pu: Pump, DG: Diesel Generator, R: Road access. 
 
 
Figure 8: Representation of the system of systems highlighting its underlying structure of four hierarchical levels 
represented by the rectangular (level 1), the dashed (level 2), the dotted (level 3) and the solid (level 4) oval 
shapes. NPP: Nuclear Power Plant, EE: External Energy, EW: External Water, IE: Internal Energy, IW: 
Internal Water, GS: Generation Station, S: Substation, Po: Pole, Pi: Pipe, Pu: Pump, DG: Diesel Generator, R: 
Road access. 
 
 Figure 9: Hierarchical representation of the system of systems. NPP: Nuclear Power Plant, EE: External 
Energy system, EW: External Water system, IE: Internal Energy system, IW: Internal Water system, GS: 
Generation Station, S: Substation, Po: Pole, Pi: Pipe, Pu: Pump, DG: Diesel Generator, R: Road access, L: 
Level. 
The nuclear power plant is at the top (level 1) of the hierarchy. Its safety is supported by the 
power and water systems that are partitioned, at the level 2, into external and internal parts: 
external energy (EE), internal energy (IE), external water (EW) and internal water (IW). The 
road accesses are the recovery supporting elements and, as explained in Section 3.1, they 
belong to the systems to which they provide support, i.e., in this test system they belong to the 
corresponding EE, IE, EW and IW systems. The level 3 is, then, composed by single 
individual components or road accesses or a combination of them, and the level 4, the most 
specified level, is formed by the individual elements (components and road accesses) of the 
system of systems. Notice that only the recovery supporting elements can belong to different 
systems (or groups), e.g., R1 and R2 are within both the IE and IW systems, whereas the other 
components appear in just one system, e.g., the pole Po2 belongs to the EE system.  
The roads (elements R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6) are used only for the recovery task and, thus, do 
not influence the state of other parts of the system of systems, i.e., their failures do not cause 
the stop of the running of other components. On the contrary, they play a role for system 
recovery because if they are damaged they have to be recovered to allow reaching the system 
components that are failed for repairing them, and eventually restoring the safety of the 
critical plant. In other words, if a component fails, the road access to it has to be available for 
its recovery. For this reason, the components of the level 3 of the hierarchy are grouped 
together with the corresponding road, e.g., the substation (S) is grouped with the road R6, the 
diesel generator (DG) is grouped with the two roads R1 and R2, etc. Instead, when a road is 
connected with more than one component, the first grouping is among the components and, 
then, at the next higher level, the components are grouped with the road, e.g., the components 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
of the external water systems (pipes and pump) are grouped together at level 3 and then they 
are grouped with the road R3 at level 2. This grouping at level 3 allows highlighting the 
contribution of a road with respect to all the components (one or more) to which it provides 
access. 
The road R7, plays a role in the external energy subsystem which goes beyond the access for 
recovery, as it provides the generation station with the access for the operators and materials 
necessary to its functioning. Therefore, the damage to this access road can cause the stop of 
the generation station and, as a consequence, the failure of the external energy subsystem. For 
this reason, it is not grouped with the generation station at the third hierarchical level. 
 
The capacity of recovering of the system of systems is quantified in terms of the time needed 
to recover the safe state of the critical plant. To compute this, the evolution in time of the 
system of systems is included in the SPRA framework. For the sake of simplicity, damages 
from aftershocks are not considered in the time-dependent analysis. 
As illustrated in the procedure of Section 3.2, the recovery time of the nuclear power plant is 
computed starting from the recovery time of the individual components at the bottom level of 
the hierarchy which is climbed from bottom to top through the configurations of the 
components or systems at each level. 
To account for the uncertainty in the duration of the recovery, lognormal distributions have 
been associated to the recovery time of the individual components. Table 3 shows the means 
and the variances used in this study; these values have been taken on the basis of the 
following consideration. The time to recover a component depends on its size, its location, 
and the type of damage and the easiness to find the failure. It is assumed that, the components 
inside the nuclear power plant need more time for the recovery than the components outside. 
In particular, this happens when it is necessary to replace part of the component or the entire 
component given its huge dimensions and the difficulty to operate inside the plant.  
For this reason, we have assumed that the mean of the time needed to recover the pump inside 
the nuclear power plant is larger than that needed for the pump outside. The large mean value 
of the time to recover the pool is due to its size, location inside the plant and difficulty in 
restoration. The time to repair a pipe could be very short (even few hours), but we have 
assumed a mean value equal to 4 days to account for the difficulty in locating the break. The 
diesel generator has a time of repair with a high uncertainty (variance equal to 5), because it 
may vary significantly depending on the type of damage. The components with lowest mean 
value of the recovery time are the power pole, the road, the generation station and the 
substation that are outside the plant; the latter are affected by large uncertainty (variances of 5 
and 10, respectively), because their recovery depends on the intensity of the damage, e.g., a 
generation station can be slightly perturbed by the earthquake and its repairing can last few 
hours but it can also be destroyed and in this case the time to build it again is obviously much 
higher. 
Table 3: Parameters of the lognormal distributions that describe the recovery time of the single components of 
the system of systems. 
Components Mean [days] Variance 
Pump (inside the plant) 75 3 
Pump (outside the plant) 5 3 
Pipe 4 3 
Pool 75 3 
Diesel Generator 30 5 
Power pole 1.5 3 
Generation Station 1 10 
Substation 1 5 
Road 2 3 
 
By way of example, the explanation of the procedure for the evaluation of the time to recover 
power at the hierarchical level 3 and 2 for the test system under analysis is illustrated in the 
following, with reference to the Figures 10 – 11. 
At level 3 of the hierarchy, there are five groups for the external energy (EE) system and one 
for the internal energy (IE) system. For the individual components of the EE system, i.e., 
generation station and road R7, the recovery times are described by lognormal distributions 
whose parameters are reported in Table 3, whereas for the groups made by the pairs of 
components and road access, e.g., substation and road R6 (S_R6), the recovery time is 
computed on the basis of the relations among them represented by the fault tree in Figure 10. 
For the group of the IE system, the fault tree of the recovery time of the triplet “DG_R1_R2” 
is reported in Figure 11.  
As reported in the procedure of Section 3.2, given the assumption of unlimited resources for 
restoration, the recovery starts at the same time (i.e., immediately after the earthquake) on all 
the components in need. Actually, one exception is made for those components whose access 
is disrupted; in this case, the recovery is sequential: first, the access to them is restored and, 
then, components recovery starts.  
  
Figure 10: Fault tree representation for the computation of the recovery time (RT) of the pair “S_R6” at level 3 
of the hierarchy; S: Substation, R: Road access. 1 represents the failure state. 
 
 
Figure 11: Fault tree representation for the computation of the recovery time (RT) of the triplet “DG_R1_R2” at 
level 3 of the hierarchy; DG: Diesel Generator, R: Road access. 1 represents the failure state. 
 
At level 2, the recovery time of the EE system is the maximum recovery time of the elements 
of level 3, since they are connected in series (Figure 12). The recovery time of the IE system 
is that of the triplet “DG – R1 – R2” computed at level 3.  
 Figure 12: Fault tree representation for the computation of the recovery time (RT) of the external energy system 
(EE) at level 2 of the hierarchy; GS: Generation Station, S: Substation, Po: Pole, R: Road access. 
 
Analogous reasoning is used to define the recovery time for the water system at level 3 and 2. 
 
To compute the recovery time at level 1, the logic relations (LR) between the external and 
internal energy and water systems at level 2 are given in Figure 13 and the corresponding 
state matrix of the nuclear power plant is reported in Table 4. 
 
 
Figure 13: Schematic representation of the relations (LR) that exist between the external energy (EE) internal 
energy (IE), external water (EW) and internal water (IW) systems at the level 2 of the hierarchy. 
 
Table 4: State matrix of the nuclear power plant (NPP) (level 1) on the basis of the states of the external energy 
(EE) internal energy (IE), external water (EW) and internal water (IW) systems (level 2); 1 represents the failure 
state. 
EE IE EW IW NPP 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
The EE and EW systems are grouped together in the relation LR1 because the EW system 
needs the EE system to work. The relation LR2 considers the IE and EE systems with respect 
to the relation LR3, since the IW system can receive electrical inputs both from the IE and EE 
systems and at least one of these two systems must work. The relation LR4 includes all the 
relations LR1, LR2 and LR3 and represents the nuclear power plant.  
The recovery time of the nuclear power plant (Figure 14) is obtained by the minimum of the 
recovery time of the systems involved in the relations LR1 and LR3, since its safety is 
guaranteed when it is provided with both energy and water inputs. Therefore it is computed 
by the minimum recovery time of the pairs “EE – EW”, “EE – IW” and “IE – IW”.  
 Figure 14: Sketch of the computation of the recovery time (RT) of the nuclear power plant (NPP) at level 1 of the 
hierarchy on the basis of the recovery time of the external energy (EE) internal energy (IE), external water (EW) 
and internal water (IW) systems, grouped according the relations LR1 and LR3 identified in Figure 13. 
For the sake of simplicity, the assumption has been made that the internal emergency devices 
will not stop functioning once successfully started. In fact, the diesel generator can be 
refueled in operation without causing an interruption of the production of the electrical energy 
and the pool of the internal water system has been assumed of infinite capacity. 
4.3. Results 
The Monte Carlo simulation for Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment illustrated in Section 
3.2 has been applied to the test system of Section 4.1 for two values of earthquake 
magnitudes, M= 5.5 and M = 6 on the Richter scale at the epicenter of coordinates (x, y) = 
(70, 70) (Figure 4). The number of simulations (NT) of the components configurations for 
each magnitude value is 2000 and the number of recovery time simulations (NR_T) for each 
configuration that turns the nuclear power plant (NPP) in an unsafe state is 5000. These 
numbers have been arbitrarily chosen by the authors in such a way to reach a good trade-off 
between precision of the results and computational cost. 
 
Figure 15 shows the estimated probabilities (under all assumptions made) that the nuclear 
power plant reaches an unsafe state upon the occurrence of an earthquake of magnitude equal 
to 5.5 (left) and 6 (right) on the Richter scale. The estimated conditional probabilities of 
failure of the external energy (EE), external water (EW), internal energy (IE) and internal 
water (IW) systems, given that the NPP has entered into an unsafe state, are also indicated.  
  
Figure 15: Estimate of the probability that the nuclear power plant (NPP) reaches an unsafe state upon 
occurrence of an earthquake of magnitude equal to 5.5 (left) and 6 (right) on the Richter scale, and the estimates 
of the conditional probability of failure of the external energy (EE), external water (EW), internal energy (IE) 
and internal water (IW) systems, given that the NPP has reached an unsafe state. 
 
As expected, the higher the magnitude of the earthquake, the higher is the probability that the 
safety of the nuclear power plant cannot be assured. 
The estimated probabilities of failure of the IW and EW systems are similar to that of the NPP 
at both magnitudes. This is because the two systems mostly contribute to the reaching of the 
NPP unsafe state. A qualitative analysis of the fragility values of the elements of the power 
and water systems, given in Table 5 in decreasing order for M = 5.5, on the left, and M = 6, 
on the right, shows that the first two components with higher fragility values are the pumps of 
the IW and EW systems. At magnitude 5.5 on the Richter scale, the third element in Table 5 is 
the road R7 that belongs to the EE system followed by the DG of the IE system that never 
fails in the simulation performed, due to its low fragility value (2.52*10-3). At magnitude 6 on 
the Richter scale, the third element with higher fragility is represented by the pool that in the 
ranking at magnitude 5.5 is in the 10th position; this represents a further weak element of the 
internal water system. The other components remain in the same ranking order both at 
magnitude 5.5 and 6 on the Richter scale, with increased fragility values for the higher 
magnitude. 
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NPP EE EW IE IW
0.0120 0 0.0620 0.0520 0.0620 
0.7925 
0.7215 
0.7920 
0.0285 
0.2965 
NPP EE EW IE IW
Table 5: Conditional probability of failure of the components of the system of systems given an earthquake of 
magnitudes 5.5 (left) and 6 (right) on the Richter scale. The values are reported in decreasing order. GS: 
Generation Station; S: Substation; R: Road access; Po: Pole; Pi: Pipe; DG: Diesel Generator; Pu: Pump; M: 
Magnitude. 
 
M = 5.5 
 
M = 6 
Pu2 3.78E-01 Pu2 9.32E-01 
Pu1 1.27E-01 Pu1 7.46E-01 
R7 3.66E-02 Pool 3.80E-01 
DG 2.52E-03 R7 3.08E-01 
S 1.94E-03 DG 2.86E-02 
Pi4 7.40E-04 S 2.74E-02 
Pi3 7.40E-04 Pi4 9.64E-03 
Pi2 7.35E-04 Pi3 9.64E-03 
Pi1 7.27E-04 Pi2 9.61E-03 
Pool 4.57E-05 Pi1 9.53E-03 
GS 7.05E-06 GS 1.13E-03 
Po2 6.54E-10 Po2 1.00E-05 
Po1 1.01E-10 Po1 5.28E-06 
 
We now proceed with the evaluation of the capacity of recovering of the system of systems, 
starting from the top level of the hierarchy (recovery of the critical plant safety) and 
proceeding downward with the analysis of the lower levels to identify the causes and major 
contributors to the higher levels. The criticality importance measure [13], FQ,f(:), of the 
component (or group) i at level L, L = 2, ...,NL, of the hierarchy at time t is used to guide the 
analysis through the hierarchical model. It is defined as the probability that the component (or 
group) i at level L, L = 2, ...,NL, of the hierarchy is critical for the system and failed at time t, 
given that the system is failed at time t: 
FQ,f(:) = !
,rb()∙(Q!rb())
L(rb())              (7) 
where .Ff_(:) is the reliability of the component (or group) i at level L+1 of the hierarchy, 
	f_(:) is the vector of reliabilities of the components (or groups) at level L+1 of the 
hierarchy, {(f_(:)) is the system reliability, dependent on the reliabilities of the individual 
components (or groups) at level L+1 of the hierarchy and on the system configuration, 
	F,f_(:) is the Birnbaum’s measure of importance of the i-th component (or group) at level 
L+1 of the hierarchy and it is defined as F,f_(:) = 	 L(rb())Q!rb()  [13]. 
With respect to the test system under analysis, the system reliability (level 1) depending on 
the reliabilities of the groups of level 2 and on their logic relations reported in Table 4, has 
been computed as follows: 
{()(:)) = 1 − .) (:).) (:)1 − .) (:).) (:) + 1 − .) (:).) (:).) (:).) (:) +
.) (:)1 − .) (:)1 − .) (:).) (:) + .) (:)1 − .) (:).) (:)1 − .) (:) +
	.) (:)	1 − .) (:).) (:).) (:) + .) (:).) (:)1 − .) (:).) (:) +
.) (:).) (:).) (:)1 − .) (:) + .) (:).) (:).) (:).) (:) = .) (:).) (:) +
.) (:).) (:) + .) (:).) (:) − .) (:).) (:).) (:) − .) (:).) (:).) (:)  
The reliability .) (:), .	) , (:).) (:) and .) (:) of the EE, IE, EW and IW systems, 
respectively, at level 2 of the hierarchy, depend on the reliability of the groups at level 3, that 
in turns depend on the individual components at level 4. For example, the reliability .) (:) at 
level 2 depends on the reliability of the groups Pi1-Pu1-Pi2 and R3 at level 3 (Figure 9); the 
first group is composed by three components, Pi1, Pu1 and Pi2, in series, thus, its reliability is 
the product of the single reliability of the corresponding elements at level 4 of the hierarchy 
(.FF)* (:) = 	 .F+ (:).+ (:).F)+ (:)), whereas the second group, having no impacts on 
the state of the system EW (as explained in Section 4.2) is not considered in the computation 
of the reliability .) (:). The reliabilities of the individual components at level 4 are the 
complement to 1 of the corresponding conditional probabilities of failure, given a magnitude 
value, reported in Table 5. 
 
Figure 16 shows the probability density functions (PDFs) (on the left) and the respective 
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) (on the right) of the time it takes to restore the 
safety of the nuclear power plant when an earthquake of magnitude 5.5 (solid line) and 6 
(dashed line) on the Richter scale occurs. The 95th percentile of the distributions is used as 
indicator of the time it takes to recover safety. As expected, at the lower magnitude the time 
for recovering safety is shorter.  
 
 Figure 16: Left: probability density functions of the recovery time of the safety of the nuclear power plant when 
an earthquake of magnitude 6.5 (solid line) and 7 (dashed line) on the Richter scale occurs. Right: 
corresponding cumulative distribution functions. 
 
In Table 6, the values of the criticality importance measure of the systems at level 2 (external 
and internal power and water systems) with respect to the level 1 of the hierarchy (critical 
plant) are reported. It can be seen that the EW and IW systems have a significantly higher 
impact than EE and IE systems both at lower and higher magnitudes. 
 
Table 6: Criticality importance measures of the external (E) and internal (I) power (E) and water (W) systems 
for magnitudes equal to 5.5 and 6 on the Richter scale. 
  M = 5.5 M = 6 
,o 0.2081 0.0984 
,o 9.8E-04 4.8E-04 
,o 0.7614 0.6059 
,o 0.9984 0.9883 
 
Figures 17 and 18 show the probability density functions of the time it takes to recover the 
internal and external parts of the power and water systems (level 2 of the hierarchy) after the 
occurrence of an earthquake of magnitude equal to 5.5 and 6 on the Richter scale, 
respectively.  
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 Figure 17: Probability density functions of the recovery time of the internal (I) and external (E) parts of the 
power (E) (left) and water (W) (right) systems, given the occurrence of an earthquake of magnitude (M) equal to 
5.5 on the Richter scale. 
 
Figure 18: Probability density functions of the recovery time of the internal (I) and external (E) parts of the 
power (E) (left) and water (W) (right) systems, given the occurrence of an earthquake of magnitude (M) equal to 
6 on the Richter scale. 
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At magnitude 5.5 on the Richter scale, the recovery time of the IE system is not present since 
this system has never failed in the simulation. 
At magnitude 6, the recovery times of the external parts of the energy and water systems are 
concentrated at values lower than the recovery times of the internal parts, which means that 
the recovery times of the systems at level 2 depend on the recovery of the external parts. 
 
Figure 19 shows the probability density functions of the time it takes to recover the groups of 
the external water system at the level 3 of the hierarchy, for an earthquake of magnitude 6 on 
the Richter scale. 
 
Figure 19: Probability density functions (PDFs) of the recovery time of the groups at level 3 of the hierarchy for 
the external water system, given the occurrence of an earthquake of magnitude (M) equal to 6 on the Richter 
scale. 
The group of components Pi1-Pu1-Pi2 contributes mostly to the recovery time of the EW 
system since the state of the road R3 has no impact in the state of the EW system, as 
explained in Section 4.2; then, the criticality importance measure of Pi1-Pu1-Pi2 is 0.6059, 
i.e., it is equal to Q,)	 as shown in Table 6. 
 
Figure 20 illustrates the recovery time distributions of the components Pu1, Pi1 and Pi2 at 
level 4 of the hierarchy, and Table 7 reports the corresponding criticality importance measure 
values: at level 4, the major contributor to the recovery time is the component Pu1 that has the 
highest importance measure value equal to 0.5906.  
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 Figure 20: Probability density functions (PDFs) of the recovery time of the components Pi1, Pu1 and Pi2 given 
the occurrence of an earthquake of magnitude (M) equal to 6 on the Richter scale. 
Table 7: Criticality importance measures of the groups at the level 4 of the hierarchy, for an earthquake of 
magnitude (M) equal to 6 on the Richter scale. 
 
M = 6 
l,n 1.93E-03 
l,n  5.91E-01 
o,n 1.95E-03 
 
A similar analysis on the internal water system (here not reported, for brevity), leads to the 
conclusion that the pump and the pool are the most relevant components for the time of 
recovery of such system. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have adopted a system-of-systems framework previously proposed by the authors for the 
analysis of the risk of a critical plant (a nuclear power plant in the example worked out) 
exposed to hazardous external events (earthquakes in the example worked out), so as to 
account for the influence of the interdependent infrastructures in which the plant is embedded. 
We have represented the system of systems with a hierarchical model and used Monte Carlo 
simulation for its probabilistic evaluation in terms of the safety of the nuclear power plant and 
its capacity of recovering, measured in terms of the time needed to restore safety.  
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The plus of this framework is that it allows performing a systematic analysis through the 
hierarchical levels of the model, and identifying the contribution to the safety recovery time of 
the system-of-systems individual elements (here measured by the criticality importance 
measure). The results which are obtained by such type of analysis can be useful to point out 
which systems are recovered early and which take more time to be recovered. These findings 
can help identifying margins for improvement of the structural/functional responses of the 
critical elements, for improving the global recovery of the system of systems so as to increase 
the safety of the critical plant. In the end, they can inform decision makers in their planning 
choices of actions for increasing the safety of critical plants. 
Future work will be devoted to explore other system modeling and analysis approaches for 
comparison, like for example Multilevel Flow Modelling (MFM) [30], Stocastic Flowgraphs 
[31], Goal Tree Success Tree – Master Logic Diagram (GTST – MLD) [32], with the aim of 
pointing out limitations and benefits with respect to their application. 
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